Introduction
Air traffic control centres constitute a
worldwide infrastructure directing aircraft in travelling between airports as
well as in landing and taking off. It facilitates air traffic making it a
critical infrastructure, as air traffic is indispensable for swift
transportation of people and freight. Failure will remove an essential safety
component endangering people, goods and aircraft and may cause serious
disruption to economy. Safety and efficiency is based upon a net of connected
ground air traffic control centres where every node depends upon on efficiency
of neighbouring control centres. Failure in a centre affects neighbouring
centres, often in different counties.
The terrorist attacks in the United States on
the morning of 11 September 2001 exposed the mutual dependency of air traffic
controls in different areas and countries. Due to the terrorist attacks, the
United States closed its air space and shortly after, the Canadian government
closed their airspace as well. This caught about 400 aircraft already over the
North Atlantic en route from Europe to North America. About 200 of them had not
yet passed the halfway point. They turned back to Europe and were taken care of
by the Irish and Icelandic air traffic control centres. The remaining 239
aircraft were diverted to airports in Eastern Canada. Additionally, Canadian
air traffic controllers’ actions were restricted, as the Canadian government
requested them to avoid, if possibly, redirecting planes to large urban areas,
because of security concerns. All 239 aircraft landed safely. For example, 38
went to Gander airport on Newfoundland which required turning runways into
parking ramps.
Air traffic control systems need to have the
ability safely to handle complex, even chaotic, situations. Such situations are
prepared trough training of air traffic controllers and the use of
sophisticated equipment at ground control centres and in aircraft. Aircraft
caught on their cruise of the Atlantic flew along airways distinguishing from
the roads we drive on in two basic ways. They have several tiers and are
virtual, only being delineated by beacons or on a map. Therefore, pilots rely
on systems measuring speed, direction, altitude and distances to other aircraft
and communication with pilots in other aircraft and ground air traffic
controls.
Safe air traffic calls for wide separation of
aircraft, while efficiency calls for short separation to facilitate frequent
arrival of aircraft. Therefore,
air traffic control operation is always bases upon balancing of safety and
efficiency based on a governance structures and available technology. The
Eurocontrol organization facilitated safe and efficient air traffic in West Europe since 1963. Between the
1960s and the 1990s, more efficient air traffic was gained through introducing
new, complex technology depending on electronic cybernetic systems and with few
exceptions relied on national governance.
The end of the Cold War eased cooperation
between civilian and military air traffic, flying across the divide between
East and West Europe became easier, and Eurocontrol’s sphere of operation
expanded and came to encompass most of East Europe. Simultaneously, air traffic
was deregulated. The outcome was soaring air traffic. Now the focus in
negotiating air traffic control in Europe shifted from improved technology to
governance.
IP aims and objectives
This IP has four objectives. First, to analyse
the evolving roles of technology, governance and economy in negotiations on
safety and efficiency at Eurocontrol and within the Danish government and civil
service, since the 1960s. Eurocontrol was based on various forms of transnational
governance and its air traffic control systems were designed to serve several countries.
In contrast, the Danish government had a national approach until 1994, when it joined
Eurocontrol.
Second, to analyse the possibilities and
limitations of various governance structures in air traffic control and the
problems of relying on complex, in some cases cybernetic, technical systems.
Third, to discuss the contributions of
Eurocontrol’s design and operation to the shaping Europe.
Fourth, to discuss how Eurocontrol contributed
to an understanding of the character and nature of “critical infrastructures”,
and which concepts and perspectives are most fruitful for this analysis.
Contributions
The analysis of cybernetic elements in air
traffic control systems and the focus on governance in this IP will provide
unique insights into the shaping, possibilities and limitations of critical
infrastructures compared to existing and ongoing research.
To attain these contributions, the IP’s
analysis will develop the scope of analysis beyond integration of the existing
research around air traffic control. Man-machine interface essential in the
development of air traffic control was studied (eg. Mindell 2002, Sanne 2003)
and several scholars studied institutional change in history of airlines and
regulation of traffic rights (Lyth 1997, Heinrich-Franke 2005, Kranakis 2005).
Also, capabilities and limitations of other large information technology
systems have been analysed (eg, Agar 2003, Heide 2004)
Methodologies
This IP will mainly be
based on qualitative analysis of archives, publications and information collected
in interviews. The main archives will be the Eurocontrol archives in Brussels, Belgium,
and the archives from the Danish Ministry of Transportation and the Danish
Civil Aviation Administration; access to these archives have been arranged. This
material will be complemented with relevant German, Norwegian and Swedish
material. Key actors will be interviewed.
Quantitative analysis
will be used based on data complied by others, for example Eurocontrol and
national air traffic authorities.
This IP will include
studies of catastrophes (like the mid-air collision of two civilian aircraft in
2002 near Lake Constance) and near collisions
explainable through defunct technology or governance structure. Study of these cases will include reports from subsequent investigations.
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